Two Theaters, One Backstage

I wrote this essay for the 2025 Essay Competition of the 17th German-American Conference. I am publishing a slightly edited version here. The topic question was: "Germany, the United States, and the wider alliance are at a crossroads. We are entering a new era of international relationships, affecting dimensions such as global trade, defense, and security. This moment calls for a Transatlantic Transformation – a rethinking of how we collaborate, communicate, and confront global challenges together. What are your ideas for redefining the transatlantic partnership in light of this transformation? How would you reinvigorate it for the future?"

The transatlantic alliance is navigating a new world with an old map. We speak of a single alliance, but we operate and are drawn to two distinct strategic theaters — America in the Pacific, Europe in the East. Neither one has the capacity, nor the will, to do the other's backyard work. Still, there is a common backstage, upon which both our fates depend: semiconductors and rare earth elements, energy flows and financial networks, and the industrial capacity that transforms raw materials into advanced weaponry and critical infrastructure. All flow through channels that our enemies have already begun to strangle. Today, the Dragonbear wages war through supply chain strangulation and strategic dependency.¹ For too long, we have been blind to this threat. The task now is to divide acute military responsibilities, but unite on everything else — two theaters, one backstage.

As R. R. Reno observes, the post-war consensus has ended, closing the “long 21st century” (Reno 2019). At home, political movements increasingly choose closeness over openness, loyalty over universality. Abroad, the return of power politics demands the prioritization of national interests and a will to power. Yet these forces take different shapes across the Atlantic.

The United States is drawn to the Pacific, the center of its strategic doctrine. With Trump's re-election, the “new” has won over the “old”: he is not an anomaly, but part of a lasting shift. Under his leadership, the US asserts itself with bold rather than cautious resolve. To avoid stasis at any cost, even a wrong step is better than none. For much of its history, two oceans shielded America. But oceans only reassure if your greatest fear is an invasion; Today, America is fighting for global and technological primacy, not for territory.

Europe, by contrast, is drawn to the East. Its political establishment — the very architects of its current vulnerability — remains in power, steeped in process. Decades of reliance on American security guarantees and cheap external energy have left it ill-prepared for a world in which both are uncertain. It responds more deliberately than decisively, though Russian aggression is forcing an awakening. To survive and ultimately thrive, Europe must adapt to a new map.²

This creates a dangerous prisoner's dilemma. America is tempted to befriend Russia, in order to isolate China. Europe is tempted to accept Chinese influence, in order to focus on Russia. But both are shortcuts, and both are dangerous. Behind the scenes, China and Russia have already chosen their side: The Dragonbear is a threat multiplier.³ Alone, the West will lose. Only together can it face this new danger from two sides. But together in what? What binds, and what can guide us in these times?

Fixating on potential military conflicts in Taiwan or the Baltics under NATO Article 5 would be strategic ignorance. Today, our shared economic infrastructure and prosperity are already under attack. Our adversaries understand this intuitively. They see the “backstage” — the global flows of semiconductors, rare earth elements, financial data, and energy — as a single, integrated battlefield. Dual use is a central pillar of China's strategy and was a key driver of American innovation during the Cold War, yet it remains stigmatized in Europe. We treat as separate policy domains what is a single, integrated battlefield.

Where would Ukraine be today, if Europe wasn’t so dependent on Russian gas? And what would happen, if China stopped exporting refined raw materials altogether? Once, China adopted Western industrial technology brick by brick: When the German steel mill "Westfalenhütte" was decommissioned in 2001, it was not scrapped. Its 250,000 tons of steel were meticulously disassembled, shipped 10,000 km, and reassembled on the Yangtze. 160 years of industrial history ended - and 160 years of industrial knowledge were transferred.⁴

Today, China is not only limiting the export of raw and refined materials, but that same transfer of the technology to produce them: strategic dependency. The very weapons that are supposed to protect US citizens rely on Chinese components. China exploits this vulnerability deliberately. It can, and does, bottleneck European rearmament in the face of Russian aggression, by limiting supply of critical components. These export controls will not stop anytime soon. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that China is building a "unified control export system" for the next decade and beyond.⁵

Contrary to some fearmongers, we are not a doorstep away from World War III. We are, however, deep in Cold War II. But there is a crucial difference. Today's conflict is asymmetric: Unlike in Cold War I, where each side owned their own industrial base, we have since outsourced ours to China. From a Chinese perspective, it is only logical to use this dependency as a strategic weapon.

Thus, the new partnership must focus on regaining control of this common backstage. This requires systematically replacing adversarial dependencies with resilient, integrated allied supply chains. The strategic focus shifts from a shared frontline to a shared industrial base. What does this mean in practice?

First, Europe must defend its sovereignty as one. The European Coal and Steel Community, the seed from which today’s European Union grew, was founded to end war between its members; now it must protect them from external aggression. Sovereignty implies a shared nuclear stockpile alongside other capabilities. Ukraine learned the bitter truth: promises decay, but nuclear deterrents endure. The goal is not to exclude America, but to free its resources for the Pacific.

Second, America and Europe must forge a new Atlantic Resilience Compact — a deep integration of economic and technological defenses. We must reconceptualize defense spending to include energy security, trade and supply chain redundancy.⁶ The lesson of World War II is instructive: victory came not from American military strength at entry, but from industrial capacity and usable energy that enabled unprecedented production. Today's equivalent means rebuilding manufacturing sovereignty: semiconductor fabs, critical materials processing, energy independence.

Two theaters, one backstage. Not alliance abandonment, but the necessary path to a new one. The West still has time: we must act decisively to secure our shared foundations.

A Comment

19.11.2025: Around two months have passed since I wrote this essay. As the essay question implicitly assumed, I wrote this essay on an optimistic note: One where The Transatlantic Alliance is our answer to important, shared (industrial) challenges. So far, this is hardly the case. After China tightened its export controls, there was no transatlantic response. Instead, the US surged ahead with state-backed investments and international dealmaking, while the EU largely froze.

References

• Reno, R. R. (2019). Return of the Strong Gods: Nationalism, Populism, and the Future of the West. Sentinel.
• Tchakarova, V. (2020). The Dragonbear: A New Geopolitical Paradigm? CEIAS. https://ceias.eu/the-dragonbear-a-new-geopolitical-paradigm/
• Bermingham, F., & Lau, S. (2024). China tells EU it cannot afford to see Russia defeated in Ukraine. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3260411/china-tells-eu-it-cannot-afford-see-russia-defeated-ukraine
• NATO (2025). Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm